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1 Introduction
This paper examines to what extent labour market institutions, on one side, and the
ratio of public to private capital stock, on the other side, are relevant to the wage set-
ting curve in Spain. Following the contributions of Aschauer (1989), Barro (1990) and
subsequent research, this ratio is considered a growth driver, a variable that enhances
economic growth. Some labour-macro literature (see below) has already inspected the
role of growth drivers such as capital stock, technological change or working-age pop-
ulation. It is along these lines that the role of this ratio is taken into account in the
context of a wage setting curve comprising standard variables such as the labour market
institutions. This analysis, thus, lies in the intersection of two distinct conceptions of
the labour market: the Institutionalist view, with its main focus in the notion of equi-
librium, and the Chain Reaction Theory (CRT) view, with its dynamic perspective.
In the institutionalist approach wage pressure factors play the central role.1 Among
them are the labour market institutions, typically classified in four categories: wage
bargaining institutions, labour taxation, employment protection legislation, and unem-
ployment protection legislation. Their impact is generally analyzed via reduced-form
unemployment equations with a significant exception in Nunziata (2005), who provides
an empirical analysis in terms of the labor cost.2 Another standard feature is the use
of five-year averages of the time series to eliminate conjunctural variations and better
focus on equilibrium or long-term relationships. This procedure, claimed to be correct
on the grounds that institutions hardly vary across time, gives rise to an important
concern: to take five-year averages impoverish s the available information; together
with the estimation of single-equation models, it undermines the role of labour market
adjustments in the presence of shocks.
An alternative to the institutionalist approach is the CRT:3 it focuses on the im-
portance of the lagged adjustment processes and outlines the central role of the growth
drivers in explaining the unemployment trajectory. For example, Henry, Karanassou
and Snower (2000) and Karanassou, Sala and Snower (2003 and 2004) find capital stock
to be a crucial determinant of unemployment in the UK and the EU. The empirical
methodology of the CRT involves the estimation of multi-equation systems (with a
wage setting equation always considered) and yields a salient result: the influence of
the growth drivers is found to overcome the importance of wage pressure factors in
1See Nickell, Nunziata and Ochel (2005).
2This is important since in reduced-form unemployment equations the eﬀect of wages is substituted
by their determinants. Hence, the influence of institutions on wage setting is not explicitly considered,
and only their direct impact on unemployment is analyzed. This of course, may cause an overesti-
mation of the unemployment consequences of institutions. Nunziata (2005) investigates the impact of
institutions on wage setting, but does not explain their final indirect impact on unemployment.
3See Karanassou and Snower (1997, 1998), Henry, Karanassou and Snower (2000) or Karanassou,
Sala and Snower (2003 and 2004).
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explaining unemployment.
To confront these two views, the Spanish wage setting curve is estimated to test:
(i) to what extent the ‘usual suspects’ from the institutionalist view are relevant in a
dynamic framework; and (ii) the relevance of a growth driver such as the ratio of public
to private capital.
The empirical methodology diﬀers from Nunziata (2005). To take five-year means
would imply the need to increase the number of cross-section units to gain degrees of
freedom for the estimation; this would force the consideration of a large group of coun-
tries. Instead, this paper relies on a single-country detailed time-series investigation.
The implications of this analysis are many. First, if wages are sensitive to the ratio of
public to private capital there is a new source of long run employment eﬀects of public
capital beyond its well-known impact via Total Factor Productivity (TFP). Second, it
starts filling a gap in the empirical literature on the economic impact of public capi-
tal. This impact has traditionally been investigated leaving wages apart: treated as an
exogenous variable all the wage-labour demand feedback eﬀects have been overlooked.
Third, it evaluates the direct impact of institutions on wage setting, in contrast to the
conventional attention on just their unemployment consequences. Finally, this evalua-
tion is conducted in a dynamic framework along the lines of some other work outlining
the relevance of growth drivers in the labour market.
In this context there are two salient results. First, key institutional variables cap-
turing the incidence of unemployment benefits, union power or the tax system are not
relevant for the Spanish wage setting curve. On the contrary, Social Security benefits
play a very significant role and, we argue, may be capturing at least partially some of the
eﬀects of the other institutional variables. This calls for further research on the channels
through which labour market institutions aﬀect unemployment (the wage channel is one
of them, but there are also labour demand and labour supply channels). The second
salient result is the negative and significant influence of the ratio of public to private
capital stock, which is robust to diﬀerent specifications of the wage setting equation.
The structure of the paper is the following. Section 2 backs the empirical analysis
with several theoretical underpinnings. Section 3 provides some descriptive evidence
for Spain on the relationship between real wages and some of their expected determi-
nants. Section 4 deals with the estimation of the wage setting curve and its long run
implications. Section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical underpinnings
This section underpins the estimates of the wage setting curve by providing diﬀerent
theoretical arguments. The first one briefly sketches the well-knownmechanismwhereby
2
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institutions are relevant to wage setting. The second and third ones justify the presence
of the ratio of public to private capital relying, first, on the existence of a changing
elasticity of employment with respect to wages; and, second, on the consideration of
commuting costs (and, thereby, the ratio of public to private capital stock) as a relevant
element of working conditions and, thus, of the wage bargaining process.
The role of institutions is the key addition to the labour market analysis in a context
of imperfect competition (see Nunziata (2005) for a recent model along these lines).
Imperfect competition implies the existence of monopoly rents that both firms and
workers try to capture: firms fix prices as a mark-up on nominal wages (which gives
rise to a price setting curve) and workers bargain nominal wages as a mark-up on prices
(which yields a wage setting curve). This is frequently called the ‘battle of the mark-
ups’ and characterises the wage bargaining process determining the position of the price
setting and wage setting curves. These two curves replace the labour demand and labour
supply curves of the competitive labour market and their intersection determines the
equilibrium (the labour supply remains just to compute the equilibrium unemployment
rate as the distance between this intersection and the labour supply at the equilibrium
real wage). In this theoretical context, wage mark-ups are a positive function of the
workers’ bargaining power which, in turn, is enhanced by institutions such as unions,
taxes, unemployment benefits and the employment protection legislation. This is the
reason why these institutions are expected to rise real wages and are normally called
wage pressure factors. As explained below, in Spain they do not seem to be the main
wage setting driving force.
From the seminal contributions of Aschauer (1989) and Barro (1990) to the recent
study by Kamps (2006) a large stream of literature has comprehensively analysed the
economic impact of public capital (see Flores de Frutos et al. (1998) for the Spanish
case).4 A general feature of the economic growth models is the assumption of full-
employment and inelastic labour supply. This leaves the labour market out of the
analysis and has a far-reaching implication: wages are taken to be exogenous and there
are no feedback eﬀects with employment, capital stock, GDP or productivity growth.
Amidst these models, the one by Daveri and Tabellini (2000) is extended in Raurich,
Sala and Sorolla (2001) and Raurich and Sorolla (2003) to re-evaluate the economic
consequences of public capital when allowing for unemployment. The central feature
of these models is a changing elasticity of employment with respect to the ratio of
public to private capital stock:5 the higher the ratio, the larger this elasticity due to the
4It is well known that, due to congestion, it is not the level of public capital on its own what
matters, but this level relative to a measure of economic activity like private capital stock.
5Public capital aﬀects employment via TFP and real wages. The first mechanism is well-known:
the fact that GDP depends on public capital is a stylized fact after Aschauer (1989); for it to hold
public capital needs to be considered in the production function along the lines of Barro (1990). The
second can be achieved, as shown in Raurich, Sala and Sorolla (2001) and Raurich and Sorolla (2003),
3
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enhanced substitutability between private capital stock (which is now more eﬃcient)
and employment.6 The solution of these models yields a wage equation that incorporates
the ratio of public to private capital stock, together with standard determinants such
as unemployment, productivity and wage pressure factors. This type of equation is the
one estimated below for the Spanish economy.
The other rationale can be procured from the literature analyzing working condi-
tions and their influence on wage bargaining. The eﬀect of working conditions on the
workforce has been studied in some papers, generally by considering working conditions
to be bargained between workers and firms together with wages. For example, Van den
Berg and Gorter (1997) consider working conditions in a matching set up, and Daniel
and Sofer (1998) in a union set up. Central to this discussion is the fact that working
conditions is usually taken to be a broad concept including the level of sound, light,
smoke or temperature at the workplace; physical location of the firm; or commuting
costs. Among all these variables, our focus is on commuting costs, which are assumed
negatively related to the ratio of public to private capital stock. In particular, the
higher this ratio (for example, the more dense the network of train and bus stations,
the more frequent the public transport services, or the more available the highways,
always relative to a given level of economic activity), the lower the costs of commut-
ing. This argument is not new in the literature and has been recently developed by
Van Ommeren and Rietveld (2005) in the equilibrium search framework. In particular,
they develop a commuting model (that is, worker’s commuting costs are endogenously
determined) taking explicitly into account labour market imperfections and diﬀerent
bargaining power of workers and employers. Their main result is that, when productiv-
ity grows, average commuting costs and average wages both increase in the long run.
Because commuting costs are a relevant element of working conditions and are nega-
tively related to the ratio of public to private capital stock, it naturally follows that
the lower this ratio (that is, the higher commuting costs), the higher the average wage
(and vice versa).
In terms of a wage equation this argument can be intuitively pushed forward as
follows. Because worse working conditions lower the morale of the workforce and,
thereby, eﬀort, it is reasonable to conceive that lower commuting costs enhance eﬀort.7
In particular, we could think of an eﬀort function, such as the one in Collard and De la
by postulating a union monopoly or an eﬃciency wage model with a non-constant elasticity of labor
demand with respect to wages.
6For example, if transport activities become more eﬃcient due to a larger provision of public
infrastructures, private labour demand will become more sensitive to wage increases. The reason is
that firms can, to some extent, substitute labour by their enhanced capital eﬃciency due to a higher
provision of public capital stock (relative to private capital). This, of course, does not preclude any of
the well-known positive impacts of public capital stock on the economy, it is just an additional eﬀect.
7See Howitt (2002) for the link between morale and eﬀort.
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Croix (2000), where the workers chose a level of eﬀort that keeps the disutility of work
constant (and equal to zero). In this context, when commuting costs rise and worsen
working conditions, agents reduce eﬀort to keep their disutility equal to zero. As a
consequence, the firms’ reaction to maintain the level of eﬀort is to increase salaries
to enhance wage satisfaction and compensate workers for the rise in commuting costs.
This argument is of course valid for any element of working conditions such as the
level of noise, temperature, etc., and provides a plausible explanation of the positive
(negative) relationship between commuting costs (the ratio of public to private capital
stock) and wages.8
3 Empirical facts
This section provides a descriptive analysis that helps to understand the econometric
results presented below. Available data, collected from diﬀerent sources,9 allows to
consider the following central institutional variables: the replacement rate,10 unem-
ployed coverage
³
= Employees covered by U. benefitsTotal number of employees
´
, Social Security benefits11, union cov-
erage
³
= Employees covered by collective agreementsTotal number of employees
´
; and several fiscal variables such as direct
taxes and indirect taxes, Social Security contributions and the fiscal wedge. The ratio
of public to private capital stock, the unemployment rate, and labour productivity are
also considered.
Following figures 1a and 1b there is no clear cut relationship between wages and the
percentage of unemployed covered by unemployment benefits (the correlation coeﬃcient
of these two series both in levels and diﬀerences is 0.06). In the first half of the 1970s and
second half of the 1990s this relationship seems to be negative whereas, during the fall
of this coverage in the early 1980s and 1990s, wages stopped their previous rising path.
The alternative way of looking at the association between wages and unemployment
benefits is to consider the replacement rate (figures 1c and 1d). The picture in this
case is somewhat diﬀerent: the replacement rate rose in the first part of the 1980s and
remained stable in the interval between the unemployment benefits’ reforms of 1992 and
8The analytical developments of such arguments lie far beyond the scope of this paper and are left
for future research.
9OECD, FBBVA -see Mas, Pérez and Uriel (2005)- and Spanish Ministry of Labour and Social
Issues. Data provided by the FBBVA are those made available in 2005 running to 2002. Data provided
by the Spanish Ministry of Labor and Social Issues are those available from the Boletín de Estadísticas
Laborales.
10This is the proportion of unemployment benefits (averaged over the diﬀerent types of recipients)
of average earnings before tax. The series provided by the OECD are biannual. The usual procedure
of filling up the gaps by taking averages of the two adjacent years is followed.
11Social Security benefits are normalized by working-age population (i.e., all potential contributors
to the Social Security). This measure allows us to have a sense of the generosity of the Social Security
in Spain.
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2002. The correlation coeﬃcient is 0.88 for the levels, but becomes slightly negative
(-0.04) for the diﬀerences: from figure 1d there seems to be a negative association.
Figures 1e and 1f display the relationship of wages with a principal wage bargaining
institution, union coverage. Both from the levels and diﬀerences it is diﬃcult to identify
a clear pattern in their comovement (the correlation coeﬃcient attains 0.88 in levels,
and just 0.12 in diﬀerences). When considering the main labor taxation institution, the
fiscal wedge, the analysis is similar: as shown in figure 1f, both series display a growing
course in levels (with a correlation coeﬃcient of 0.96), while diﬀerent and frequently
opposite paths in their variation can be observed in figure 1h (with a resulting very low
correlation of 0.04).
The first variable considered in figure 2 is a global measure of benefits, including
unemployment benefits and other transfers by Social Security. The expected positive
relationship with wages is apparent, both from figures 2a and 2b, with correlation co-
eﬃcients of 0.99 in levels and 0.38 in diﬀerences (the latter significant at a 2% critical
value). Wages and the ratio of public to private capital stock have a rising path (figure
2c) but according to figure 2d they seem to have a negative relationship in diﬀerences
(the correlation coeﬃcient is -0.10). This is a first empirical indication of the negative
relationship postulated in our model. As we will see in Section 4, the coeﬃcient of
this ratio is quite robust to diﬀerent specifications of the estimated equation. Following
the theory, the comovement of wages and unemployment should reflect an unanimous
clear positive relationship (the correlation coeﬃcient is 0.88). From figures 2e and 2f,
though, this is not as clear-cut. Up to 1975, real wages rose without much variation in
unemployment, whereas in the 1980s they stopped rising and unemployment increased
substantially in the first half of that decade and decreased afterwards. Since the sec-
ond half of the 1990s wages remained stable while unemployment went down sharply.
Finally, figures 2g and 2h show the expected clear positive association between wages
and productivity, with a correlation coeﬃcient of 0.99 in levels and 0.59 in diﬀerences
(significant at a 1% critical value).
4 The Spanish wage setting curve
The estimation of the wage setting curve for the Spanish economy is carried out following
the AutoRegressive Distributed Lagged (ARDL) methodology developed in Pesaran
(1997), Pesaran and Shin (1999) and Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001). The ARDL
approach yields consistent estimates both in the short and long run, and is an alternative
procedure to the standard cointegration techniques (see below for details). First we
present the estimates of the wage setting equation, and then show their consistency
with the ones that would be obtained from the Johansen framework.
6
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4.1 Estimates
One of the main results of the econometric analysis is the failure of most institutional
variables to account for the Spanish average real wage trajectory in the last decades.
Recall that, in contrast to the standard literature, this analysis is dynamic, for a single
country and focuses on the wage setting curve rather than a reduced-form unemploy-
ment equation. We do not show all the unsuccessful results, but it is important to stress
that, in addition to the variables used in the specifications reported below, all the in-
stitutional variables plotted in figure 1 were also taken into account. To summarize the
results obtained from these attempts, we shall mention that unemployment coverage
displayed the expected positive sign, but was clearly non-significant, as well as union
coverage (that attained a higher t-statistic, but still far from significant at standard
critical values); the replacement rate was found to have an unexpected negative eﬀect
on wages, non-significant, but nevertheless with a t-statistic above 1. A similar surpris-
ing result was found when including the fiscal wedge, which displayed a negative and
still more significant influence on wages.
These results are striking according to the institutionalist view. The fact that we
were unsuccessful in generating significant results for most of the institutional variables
(with the exception of Social Security benefits) calls into question the crucial role that
they are generally assigned from this view.12 We have seen that the percentage of un-
employed covered by unemployment benefits has hardly any relationship with wages.
As for the rest, a plausible explanation of this outcome is the high correlation displayed
by benefits with the replacement rate (0.89), union coverage (0.88) and the fiscal wedge
(0.98). The positive correlation of the benefits’ growth rate with the diﬀerences in
the unemployed coverage (0.36 significant at a 4% critical value) and the diﬀerences
in the fiscal wedge (0.30 significant at a 7% critical value) is also noteworthy. From
this perspective, Social Security benefits should be interpreted as a global proxy of the
labour market institutions. These findings and this interpretation, however, raise the
question of what are the main mechanisms whereby labor market institutions aﬀect un-
employment. This issue is central and deserves further attention: Do these institutions
provoke real wage stickiness? To what extent? Do some of them directly aﬀect the
labour demand and the labour supply? These questions need to be answered, but the
conventional estimation of reduced-form unemployment equations hinders the response.
Table 1 displays a selection of the estimated specifications of the wage setting curve.
The starting point is the simplest equation, E1, where wages (w) are regressed on a
constant (c), their first lag, and the ratio of public to private capital stock (g) as a
12Ayala, Martínez and Ruiz-Huerta (2002) provide a detailed analysis of the labour market institu-
tions in the OECD countries. The institutional components of the labour market are found to have a
greater impact on earnings inequality than on unemployment.
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central variable in this analysis.13 The latter coeﬃcient has the correct sign, but it is
not significant. From this base-run specification other relevant variables are sequentially
added in the following order: productivity (θ) in E2, unemployment rate (u) in E3,
∆u in E4, Social Security benefits (b) in E5, and ∆g in E6. All of them are significant
at standard critical values (bt in E5 and ∆gt in E6 at 15%). Along this process, the
wage inertia coeﬃcient decreases progressively, the standard errors of the equation are
reduced and the log-likelihood increased. Because this reflects just partially the full
analysis undertaken, it is important to mention that the selection was made according
to the Akaike Information Criterion and the Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (for example,
∆gt was also included in equations E1−E5, but the resulting specifications were inferior
to the ones presented)14.
Not all these equations pass the standard misspecification tests, which are reported
in the second part of table 1: serial correlation (SC), linearity (LIN), normality (NOR),
heteroskedasticity (HET) and conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH). Observe that, at
a 5% critical value, E1 fails to pass the tests on linearity and normality, as well as E2
which in addition reveals slight serial correlation problems (normality, though, is not
rejected at a 10% critical value). In turn, in E3 and E4 the null that the residuals
are normally distributed tends to be rejected. Only in E5 all the tests hold, because
when ∆gt is added (in E6) there are diﬃculties in rejecting the null of heteroskedas-
ticity. With respect to the structural stability tests (Cusum and CusumQ), E1 fails
stability whereas the estimated coeﬃcients in E2−E6 are structurally stable. To test
for potential endogeneity of the regressors, the Hausman test was performed on the
exogenous variables of the selected equation E5: gt, ut, bt and θt. According to the
results, endogeneity problems are not a concern and we can safely conclude that the
estimates are consistent.
The short and long run elasticities of wages with respect to the ratio of public
to private capital stock
¡
εsrw−g, ε
sr
w−g
¢
are displayed in table 2. Two results are worth
mentioning. First, εsrw−g is very much robust to the inclusion of additional variables
(equations E2 − E6). Second, εlrw−g jumps from values close to -0.30 in equations
E1−E3, to values around -0.16 in equations E4−E6. Given the former have diﬀerent
sources of misspecification problems, εlrw−g can be safely placed at -0.16 (the implications
of this value are outlined below).
13The same regression as E1 was run with each institutional variable instead of gt. Unemployment
coverage and union coverage displayed the expected positive sign, but the second one was not signifi-
cant. The replacement rate and the fiscal wedge displayed a surprising negative sign, which was clearly
significant in the first case. Other variables related to labor taxation (the direct tax rate or the fiscal
pressure) were tried, but yielded equally unsuccessful results.
14The inclusion of the change of a particular variable, like ∆g, on top of the level is just a repara-
metrisation of the current and first lag of the level of that variable.
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4.2 Long run cointegrating vectors
Next we show that the ARDL based long run estimated coeﬃcients in E5 are valid and
fully consistent with those that arise from the cointegrating vectors obtained via the
Johansen’s procedure -see Johansen (1998 and 1991)-.
The econometric analysis of long run relations within trend stationary variables
is generally undertaken using Johansen’s maximum likelihood method or the Phillips-
Hansen procedure. Given that the ARDL is, in words of Pesaran and Shin (1999),
“directly comparable to the semi-parametric, fully-modified OLS approach of Phillips
and Hansen (1990) to estimation of cointegrating relations”, when comparing both
approaches Pesaran and Shin (1999) find that the Phillips and Hansen’s estimator is
outperformed by the ARDL-based estimator, especially in case of having a relatively
small sample period of analysis. In particular these authors show that, using the delta
method or the Bewley’s approach, valid standard errors can be computed for the long
run coeﬃcients estimated by OLS. To see to what extent the long run coeﬃcients of the
selected equation are significant, we use this method to estimate the error correction
representation of E515:
∆wt = −0.08
(−2.43)
∆gt + 0.21
(1.03)
∆ut +0.09
(1.51)
∆bt + 5.02
(5.20)
∆c+ 0.41
(2.87)
∆θt − 0.52
(−5.36)
ecmt−1, (1)
where the Error Correction Model (ECM) is,
ecmt−1 = wt + 0.16
(2.69)
gt + 0.59
(3.02)
ut − 0.18
(−1.60)
bt − 9.75
(−24.0)
c− 0.80
(−3.27)
θt. (2)
All the variables in the ECM (the long run elasticities) are significant at standard
critical values (5% in most cases, 10% the benefits). Beyond the already known long
run elasticity with respect to gt (-0.16), it is interesting to see that the long run elasticity
of wages with respect to labor productivity is clearly significant and attains 0.80. The
fact that it is below 1 implies that not all increases in labor productivity are translated
into wage rises and thus enhance employment. Finally, the ECM coeﬃcient (-0.52)
reveals that, when facing a shock, the Spanish wage setting curve has an immediate
adjustment of 52% of this shock.
A further feature of the ARDL approach is, in words of Pesaran and Shin (1999),
“that the ARDL-based estimation procedure based on the ∆-method developed in the
paper can be reliably used in small samples to estimate and test hypothesis on the long
run coeﬃcients in both cases where the underlying regressors are I(1) or I(0). This
is an important finding since the ARDL approach can avoid the pretesting problem
implicitly involved in the cointegration analysis of the long run relationships”. Despite
15T-statistics in parentheses.
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this advantage, it is important to show that the long run estimates of E5 are consis-
tent with the ones that would be obtained in the form of cointegrating vectors using
Johansen’s procedure.
For this to be checked, the following step is to conduct unit root tests of the variables
involved in the analysis.16 These tests lead to the conclusion that wt, gt, θt and bt are
I (1), whereas ut is I (0). Next stage is to test for the existence of cointegrating vectors
among the set of non-stationary variables: that is, the existence of a stationary linear
combination between wt, gt, bt and θt. Thus, we apply the Johansen’s procedure and
find that these variables cointegrate with the following two normalized cointegrating
vectors:17
³
1 0.15 −0.33 −0.52
´
and
³
1 0.19 −0.68 0.51
´
.
These have to be compared with the cointegrating vector implied by the ECM
corresponding to E5. In particular, given that ut is I (0), the cointegrating vector
obtained from expressi n (2) is
³
1 0.16 −0.18 −0.80
´
. To test if it conforms
with the first of the cointegrating vectors found using Johansen’s method we conduct
a likelihood ratio test which results in a value of 2.26. This needs to be compared with
a χ25% (4) = 9.49 and yields the conclusion that we cannot reject the null hypothesis
that the ARDL long run coeﬃcients conform with the cointegration analysis performed
using the Johansen’s method.
Even if a rise of 1 percentage points in g translates into a long run fall of 0.16
percent in wages, the final impact of public capital on employment remains uncertain. It
depends on the eﬀects via TFP, on possible direct eﬀects of g on employment and on the
elasticity of the labour demand with respect to wages.18 The eﬀect on unemployment
is still more uncertain, because the labour force also plays a role and, since it also
depends on wages, a new source of interactions and feedback eﬀects would have to be
considered.19
5 Summary and concluding remarks
Two distinct perspectives of the labour market have been confronted: the institution-
alist view and the Chain Reaction Theory. The former outlines the role of labour
market institutions. The latter characterises the growth drivers as main determinants
of employment and the labour force. The ratio of public to private capital stock is a
16For the sake of brevity we do not add an extra table to show the results of these tests. They are,
nevertheless, readily available upon request.
17This choice is done by using the LR tests based on the Trace of the stochastic matrix. We conduct
this cointegration analysis selecting unrestricted intercepts and no trend in the underlying VAR.
18For an empirical appraisal of all these eﬀects in the private sector see Raurich, Sala and Sorolla
(2001).
19This is, in fact, one of the salient features of the Chain Reaction Theory: the key role of the
network of interactions that can only be appraised with the estimation of multi-equation models.
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growth driver whose economic consequences have been profusely analysed in the eco-
nomic growth literature. This paper has brought it to the labour-macro analysis to
examine to what extent it is also a relevant determinant of wage setting in Spain.
From a theoretical point of view, two arguments support this relationship. The first
one is a changing elasticity of labour demand with respect to wages in response to public
capital availability (relative to private capital). This elasticity is likely to be larger, the
higher this ratio, for a simple reason. When private capital becomes more eﬃcient and,
thus, some workers dispensable, firms become more sensitive to wage increases. Raurich,
Sala and Sorolla (2001) and Raurich and Sorolla (2003) provide analytical developments
of this argument. The second argument is based on an eﬀort function depending on
the ratio of public to private capital stock. This relationship is plausible because eﬀort
depends on working conditions, commuting costs is an important working condition,
and the ratio of public to private capital is the main determinant of commuting costs.
It is well-known that eﬀort is a relevant argument of the wage level (for example, from
the eﬃciency wage literature) implying that eﬀort determinants play a role in wage
setting. Beyond some literature analysing the eﬀects of working-conditions on wage
setting -Van den Berg and Gorter (1997); Daniel and Sofer (1998)-, in Rietveld and
Van Ommeren (2005) the link between average commuting costs and average wages is
shown to be positive when productivity grows.
In studying the empirical relevance of this relationship, we have also considered to
what extent several institutional variables play a role in the Spanish wage setting curve.
The main findings are the following. First, the coeﬃcient of the ratio of public to private
capital stock is negative, significant and relatively robust to diﬀerent specifications of
the wage setting equation. Second, the long run elasticity of wages with respect to
this ratio can be placed at -0.16. These results have a far-reaching implication: there
is a wage channel whereby employment is permanently aﬀected by increases in public
capital. This joins the other well-known channels through which public investment
boosts economic growth. Third, with the exception of Social Security benefits, the
rest of the standard institutional variables do not play any relevant role in explaining
the trajectory of wages. The strong correlation of Social Security benefits with the
replacement rate, union coverage and the fiscal wedge indicates that the eﬀects of the
latter three seem to be captured by the former. Therefore, these institutional variables
are not dismissed as potential determinants of unemployment: beyond their impact on
wage setting, a careful investigation of their eﬀects through labour demand and labour
supply decisions is necessary; the estimation of reduce-form unemployment equations
does not allow this careful appraisal.
This analysis contributes to the existing literature in several respects. First, to the
identification of the wage channel. The conventional treatment of wages as exogenous
11
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(in the economic growth literature) prevents this channel from operating. Second, our
results call into question the crucial role that the institutional variables are generally
assigned from the institutionalist view. These variables are found to be central when
static reduced-form unemployment equations are estimated, therefore the question of
what are the main mechanisms whereby labor market institutions aﬀect unemployment
acquires further importance. Finally, this study reinforces the need to consider the
growth drivers, which seem to be crucial to analyze the dynamic trajectory of wages
and, thereby, of labour demand and labour supply.
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Tables
Table 1: Wage equation. Spain. 1965-2002.
Dependent variable: wt. Method: OLS.
ct wt−1 gt θt ut ∆ut bt ∆gt s.e. LL
[E1] 0.24
(1.46)
0.95
(44.1)
−0.01
(−0.40)
0.021 94.3
[E2] 2.66
(2.64)
0.68
(6.05)
−0.08
(−1.92)
0.33
(2.44)
0.019 97.3
[E3] 3.32
(3.62)
0.64
(6.27)
−0.10
(−2.60)
0.44
(3.55)
−0.29
(−3.18)
0.017 102.4
[E4] 4.26
(5.09)
0.53
(5.80)
−0.08
(−2.33)
0.55
(4.92)
−0.35
(−4.40)
0.68
(3.50)
0.015 108.6
[E5] 5.02
(5.20)
0.48
(5.04)
−0.08
(−2.43)
0.41
(2.87)
−0.30
(−3.55)
0.51
(2.31)
0.09
(1.51)
0.015 109.9
[E6] 5.55
(5.47)
0.43
(4.20)
−0.09
(−2.62)
0.43
(3.04)
−0.25
(−2.68)
0.52
(2.37)
0.11
(1.78)
−0.27
(−1.46)
0.015 111.2
Misspecification tests
SC [χ2 (1)] LIN [χ2 (1)] NOR [χ2 (2)] HET [χ2 (1)] ARCH [χ2 (1)]
[E1] 0.46
[0.500]
11.2
[0.001]
9.09
[0.011]
2.81
[0.93]
0.26
[0.609]
[E2] 4.63
[0.031]
8.86
[0.003]
4.72
[0.094]
0.66
[0.417]
0.06
[0.801]
[E3] 2.26
[0.133]
1.05
[0.306]
11.93
[0.003]
0.20
[0.658]
0.02
[0.880]
[E4] 0.96
[0.326]
0.03
[0.857]
7.36
[0.025]
0.86
[0.354]
0.37
[0.545]
[E5] 0.65
[0.421]
0.011
[0.918]
5.90
[0.052]
1.29
[0.257]
0.64
[0.422]
[E6] 0.19
[0.666]
0.16
[0.690]
1.94
[0.379]
4.48
[0.034]
1.20
[0.274]
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses; s.e.=standard errors; LL=Log likelihood.
Probabilities in brackets; 5% critical values: χ2 (1) = 3.84;χ2 (2) = 5.99
Table 2: Short and long-run elasticities with respect to g
[E1] [E2] [E3] [E4] [E5] [E6]
εsrw−g −0.014 −0.083 −0.101 −0.080 −0.082 −0.087
εlrw−g −0.297 −0.263 −0.278 −0.171 −0.159 −0.152
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Figure 1. Real wages and institutions.
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Figure 2. Real wages and other variables.
16
Page 16 of 16
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted M uscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
